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Abstract 
We estimate revealed willingness to pay for animal welfare using a panel mixed logit 
model. We utilize a unique household level panel, combining real purchases with survey 
data on perceived public and private good attributes of different types of eggs. We 
estimate willingness to pay for organic eggs controlling for trust in a positive 
connection between the public good animal welfare and the organic label and the 
private good food safety also connected to the label. Our results suggest that in the real 
world, animal welfare plays a minor role in the demand for agricultural products. 
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Interest in animal welfare has been increasing, both within the population in general and 
among the legislators who try to frame laws to match these new concerns. If society 
wishes to improve the level of animal welfare it may either prohibit production methods 
that lead to unacceptably low levels of animal welfare or it may improve market 
conditions for producers who use more animal-friendly production methods. The 
growing concern among legislators has lead to the EU Action Plan to improve animal 
welfare (IP/05/698), which was adopted by the European Union in 2006. The concern 
among consumers is reflected in the fact that in 2005, 74 percent of European citizens 
believed that they could to some degree have a positive impact on the welfare of farm 
animals by buying animal-friendly products, and more than 60 percent stated that they 
were willing to pay a price premium in order to do so (Eurobarometer 2005).  
One of the principles behind organic livestock farming is to give all livestock conditions 
of life which allow them to perform basic aspects of their innate behaviour. Whether 
this leads to a higher level of animal welfare for the individual animal is often debated, 
and the average consumer is likely to find it difficult to determine the exact level of 
animal welfare e.g. for different types of eggs. In this paper we do not attempt to define 
animal welfare (as done in e.g. Broom, 1991), but leave this definition to the individual 
consumers. A study using focus groups conducted in 1999 (Harper and Makatouni, 
2002) find that consumers associate organic products with better animal welfare, and 
that this plays a significant role when purchasing organic food. However, the same 
study indicates that animal welfare is used as an indicator of food safety and health, and 
that these factors are the main drivers behind organic purchases. When estimating 
willingness to pay for animal welfare it is therefore important to control for other 
perceived attributes of organic products, as it will be done in this paper. 
The labelling of eggs described in this paper provides consumers with a chance to signal 
willingness to pay for extra animal welfare. However, since it is not possible to exclude 
others from enjoying the improved animal welfare induced by one’s own purchase of a 
certified product this attribute is a public good, and therefore prone to free-riding which 
might undermine the effectiveness of labelling schemes. Early economic contributions 
(e.g. Sen, 1973) suggest that consumers may, in addition to self-interest, be motivated 
by what Sen called “sympathy” or “commitment” (and others refer to as “altruism”, e.g. 
Andreoni, 1990). If this type of altruistic behaviour is present among consumers it will FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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reduce the problem of free-riding. Other studies such as Gregory and Grandin (2007) 
and Woodward and Fernádez (1999) and Fernández and Woodward (1999) find that 
increased animal welfare leads to better meat, which might indicate that animal welfare 
also has a ‘private good’ dimension. The willingness to pay for this private attribute 
should be added to the willingness to pay for animal welfare as such, and whether the 
labels increase the level of animal welfare to the optimal level of consideration for the 
hens therefore depends crucially on whether the stated willingness to pay in opinion 
polls and contingent valuations is real or just cheap talk. The previous literature has 
mainly investigated stated willingness to pay, and it is therefore still not clear whether 
consumers truly are willing to pay higher market prices for increased animal welfare 
even though it is a public good.  
This paper utilises a unique dataset combining time series of actual purchase data for 
844 households with survey data on the same households, providing background 
information about the individual households along with information on the household 
specific perception of the organic label with respect to animal welfare and food safety. 
This allows us to compare willingness to pay between different socio-demographic 
groups as well as between groups with different perceptions of animal welfare in 
relation to organic eggs and food safety in relation to organic chicken. This means that 
we can establish whether the willingness to pay originates solely from ‘private good’ 
attributes, such as lower risk of falling ill, or if there is also willingness to pay for 
‘public good’ attributes like animal welfare, which may imply altruistic motives. 
The results in this paper suggest that consumers are willing to put money on the counter 
for animal welfare, but only to a small degree. Our results suggest that the stated 
willingness to pay observed in opinion polls, hypothetical discrete choice experiments 
or contingent valuation studies to a large extent is just cheap talk. The results also 
indicate that animal welfare is a significant purchase motive, even when we control for 
the private good characteristic food safety, and that households with positive 
willingness to pay for animal welfare in one type of eggs are more likely to be willing to 
pay for other types of eggs with increased levels of animal welfare.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the results of 
the previous literature on willingness to pay for animal welfare and food safety and FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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section 3 outlines the features of Danish egg labels. Section 4 describes the data, 
followed by an introduction to the theory behind willingness to pay and the panel mixed 
multinomial logit model in section 5. Section 6 discuses the practical problems of using 
market data at household level, and explains the chosen approach. Section 7 presents the 
results and section 8 concludes. 
2 Existing Knowledge 
Most previous studies of willingness to pay for animal welfare (see Norwood and Lusk, 
forthcomming; Bennet, 1997; Bennet and Blaney, 2003 and Rolfe, 1999 for animal 
welfare related to eggs, Carlsson et al. 2005 and 2007; Lagerkvist et al., 2006; 
Liljenstolpe, 2008 and Mørkbak et al. (forthcoming) for animal welfare related to pork) 
are based on stated willingness to pay, elicited through e.g. choice experiments or 
contingent valuation. Most studies find positive willingness to pay for animal welfare, 
but as numerous studies suggest, the estimated values may be subject to hypothetical 
bias (Cummings et al., 1995; Cummings and Taylor, 1999; Fox et al. 1998; List, 2001; 
List and Shogren, 1998 and Niell et al. 1994). In a meta-analysis of 29 experimental 
studies (not specifically about animal welfare) List and Gallet (2001) find that the 
estimated willingness to pay in experimental studies on average is overstated by a factor 
of about three in hypothetical settings, and that the bias is bigger for public goods than 
for private goods.  
Olesen et al. (2010) find willingness to pay for animal welfare labelled salmon by 
asking 115 Norwegian consumers to make actual purchasing decisions choosing 
between different types of salmon and an opt-out choice. This kind of experimental 
market is less hypothetical than the stated studies mentioned above. A few studies such 
as Teisl et al. (2002) and Baltzer (2004) use market data. Both studies find positive 
(revealed) willingness to pay for animal welfare. Teisl et al. find positive willingness to 
pay for a label indicating dolphin-safe tuna catching and Baltzer finds positive 
willingness to pay for eggs carrying labels indicating improved animal welfare (non-
battery eggs, see below). However, the suspicion here is that other ‘private good’ 
attributes like healthiness/safety of the product - which consumers perceive as FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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correlated with animal welfare - may be driving behaviour. Several studies have found 
willingness to pay for food safety (Alfnes, 2004; Alfnes and Rickertsen, 2003; Baker 
and Burnham, 2001; Carlsson et al., 2005; Lagerkvist et al., 2006; Liljenstolpe, 2008 
and Lusk et al., 2003). However, these studies also use stated willingness to pay and are 
therefore also subject to hypothetical bias. 
To our knowledge, only Baltzer (2004) has previously estimated revealed willingness to 
pay for different types of eggs from actual purchases, and the present study is the only 
one which uses both observed purchases, background information about buyers and 
information about buyers’ perception of animal welfare and food safety, and thereby 
separates revealed willingness to pay for animal welfare from cheap talk and from 
willingness to pay for food safety. 
3 The Egg Labels 
The Danish egg market is dominated by four different types of eggs, carrying labels 
indicating production methods with different implications for animal welfare. To bear a 
given label the production has to meet certain minimum standards, as described in 
various EU regulations. Table 1 shows the most important differences between the egg 
labels, and figure 1 shows the distribution of price premiums compared to the price of 
battery eggs.  
Table 1 Main Points of the Rules for Different Danish Production Types
1 
Egg label  Conditions for the egg-laying hens
Battery eggs  • Live in cages with 4 hens in each cage 
• 16 hens per m
2 
Barn eggs  • Live in open barns 
• 7 hens per m
2 
Free-range eggs  • Indoors: As for barn hens 
• Access to outdoor areas 
• 10 m
2 per hen on outdoor areas 
Organic eggs  • 6 hens per m
2 indoors 
• Access to outdoor areas 
• 4 m
2 per hen on outdoor areas 
• Organic feed 
• No beak trimming 
Source: The Danish Poultry Council. 
                                                 
1 For more details of the rules for different production types, see Andersen (2006). FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
 
  6





-0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00










Estimations using GfK purchase data on eggs from 26 June 1999 to 30 June 2000. Only households with answers to 
questionnaire. Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression estimator using the Gaussian kernel. Purchases made directly from 
farms excluded. Imputed prices are means of all observed prices within a given chain of stores and a given week. More 
information on this is provided in Section 6, ‘Implementation of the model’. The average price of a battery egg is 1.27 
DKK. 
The welfare of hen is considered to improve from the battery system (soon to be 
outlawed in the EU) through the barn system to free-range and organic. According to 
Harper and Makatouni (2002) consumers often confuse free-range and organic products. 
In Denmark, one of the differences between organic hens and free-range hens is that 
free-range hens may have their beaks trimmed, which is known to cause immediate and 
subsequent pain. However, severe welfare problems such as injurious pecking and 
cannibalism is much greater among non-trimmed hens (ADAS/IGER/University of 
Bristol, 2001). Whether organic hens have a better quality of life than free-range hens is 
therefore sometimes debated, but apart from the differences in rules for production, 
organic eggs have the advantage of using a familiar label that is used on many different 
food products (the Danish ‘Ø-label’, which identifies organically-produced goods). 
Consumers have a generalised image of goods bearing the Ø-label, and do not have to 
spend time and energy studying new labels such as ‘barn eggs’ or ‘free-range eggs’. In 
this paper it is therefore expected that willingness to pay for the different egg labels can 
be ranked as battery, barn, free-range and organic, where battery eggs are expected to 
yield the lowest willingness to pay and organic eggs are expected to yield the highest 
willingness to pay.  




The data are from an unbalanced Danish panel of approximately 2,000 households 
reporting all food purchases on a daily basis (GfK ConsumerScan Denmark, GfK). A 
substantial amount of socio-demographics are collected once a year, and in 2002 a large 
questionnaire on organic food was completed by the main shoppers of the households, 
including information about knowledge of and attitudes towards organic foods in 
general at household level. Single men younger than 30 years are underrepresented in 
the panel (9.2 percent in the panel, 18.8 percent in the population), while families with 
children are overrepresented (30.9 percent of the GfK households have children, only 
22.4 percent of the households in the population).  
The purchase data cover the period from 26 June 1999 to 30 June 2000.
2 This is the 
only period where all four different egg labels are recorded, before and after it is only 
recorded whether the eggs purchased were organic or not. The time delay between 
purchases and attitudes is far from optimal, but differentiated purchase data is not 
available for 2002.
3 The data allow estimation of willingness to pay for labels, 
accounting for different perceptions of the labels, and different purchasing motives. 
Among the 1,834 families who reported purchases of eggs during the period, 878 
families also answered the 2002 questionnaire, and 844 of these answered the 
perception questions used here. On average, the 844 households in the sample purchase 
                                                 
2 The Danish organic market is relatively mature. In the period 1999 to 2000 the organic budget share 
for all types of food was more than 3.5 percent. The results in this paper will therefore most likely be 
relevant for many other countries which are now approaching the same level of organic consumption. 
3 The background data allows us to identify the individuals in the household by date of birth, and 
thereby to establish that only 4.5 percent of the households changed their composition of adults between 
the time of purchase and the questionnaire. If perceptions about eggs are assumed to be stable over time, 
the questionnaire makes it possible to use the information about household perceptions of the level of 
animal welfare and food safety. In 2007 another questionnaire was issued to the same panel, and 564 of 
the 844 households used in this paper also answered this new questionnaire. In general they had 
increased their level of trust in positive animal welfare related to organic farming in general (the 
specific question about eggs was not repeated). If this increasing trend was also present between 1999 
and 2002, some of the households which are categorized as positive in this paper may have been less 
positive at the time of purchase. The estimated willingness to pay may therefore have a small bias 
towards zero.  FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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eggs 13 times during the one-year period (10,800 observed purchases).
4 As can be seen 
in table 2, the households who answered the questionnaire represent the sample almost 
perfectly, at least as far as the overall distribution on types of eggs is concerned. 
 
Table 2 Aggregate Consumption of the Four Different Types of Eggs 
Households:  All  With answers to 
questionnaire in general 
With answers to both animal 
welfare and food safety 
Purchase shares:      
Battery eggs  47  47  47 
Barn eggs  17  17  17 
Free-range eggs  10  10  10 
Organic eggs  27  26  26 
Total 100 100  100 
No. of purchases  20,676  11,178  10,800 
No. of households  1,834  878  844 
Source: GfK purchase data on eggs from 26 June 1999 to 30 June 2000. Purchases made directly from farms excluded, 
see endnote 8 in ‘Implementation of the Model’. 
 
Two of the questions in the questionnaire regarded perception of animal welfare related 
to eggs and food safety related to chicken. As can be seen in table 3, very few 
households believe that organic production has a negative impact on animal welfare 
related to eggs or food safety related to chicken, and a substantial number of households 
believe it has positive effects, though 42 percent perceived no difference in animal 
welfare. This indicates that for a very large share of the sample, organic production is 
not synonymous with animal welfare. It also appears that trust in better animal welfare 
and improved food safety are correlated. It is, however, still possible to identify the 
effects on willingness to pay separately for animal welfare and food safety, as the 
correlation is not perfect. The answers to the two questions enter separately in the 
estimation, and the cross tabulation in table 3 is merely included to illustrate the level of 
correlation. Willingness to pay among households with different perceptions of animal 
welfare and food safety is measured relative to the groups of households who perceive 
‘no difference’ (control groups). 
 
                                                 
4 23 percent of the households purchase eggs 4 times or less, 26 percent purchase eggs 17 times or 
more. FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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Table 3 Answers to Questionnaire on Perception of Animal Welfare and Food Safety
5 
No. of households (share of 
households): 
Total 
How do you perceive the risk of falling ill with bacteria 








  Total  844 (100%)  27 (3%)  571 (68%)  246 (29%) 
How do you 
perceive animal 







23 (3%)  6 (1%)  9 (1%)  8 (1%) 





466 (55%)  6 (1%)  268 (32%)  192 (23%) 
Source: AKF/GfK questionnaire from 2002. The Cronbach alpha for the two questions is 0.46, and the answers to the 
two questions enter separately in the estimation. 
Bold means Control group: Willingness to pay in the other groups is measured relative to this group. The estimated 
willingness to pay for households who perceive animal welfare to be better is the difference between the mean 
willingness to pay among households with perceived positive effect and households with no perceived effect. 
 
Our data allow actual purchases to be linked to socio-demographic information, so that 
the effects of income, age, degree of urbanisation and level of education on the 
willingness to pay for different types of eggs can be explored. Each of the socio-
demographic variables is split into sub-groups, and the willingness to pay within each 
sub-group is estimated relative to the control group indicated in table 4.  
                                                 
5 Note that the question about food safety is not related directly to organic eggs, but rather to organic 
chickens. However, the origin of food safety problems is the same in chickens and eggs (mainly 
salmonella during the period in question) and the answers are therefore used as a general indication of 
perception of food safety related to organic poultry, acknowledging that the signal cannot be expected 
to be as strong as for animal welfare. FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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b  Lowest 25%  254  30  X 
 Middle  50%  400  47   
 Highest  25%  190  23   
  Total 844  100   
Age
c  18 to 44 years  230  27   
  45 to 59 years  304  36   
  60 years or more  310  37  X 
  Total 844  100   
Degree of urbanisation
d Rural municipality  247  29  X 
Urban municipality  390  46   
Capital area (Copenhagen)  207  25   
Total 844  100   
Level of education
e  No further education stated  206  24  X 
  Vocationally oriented high-school  304  36   
  Short further education  138  16   
  Medium further education  150  18   
  Long further education  46  5   
  Total 844  100   
a: Willingness to pay in the other groups is measured relative to this group. The estimated willingness to pay in the 
Capital area is the difference between the mean willingness to pay in households in the Capital area and those in the 
rural municipalities. If the parameter for Capital area is significant, it means that the difference between the utility in the 
Capital area and that in the rural municipalities is significantly different from zero. 
b: Income is recorded in brackets of DKK 50,000 (~€6,700). These brackets are divided by the number of persons in the 
household, weighted by the OECD-modified scale i.e. 1 for the first adult, 0.5 for the next adults and 0.3 for children 
(OECD). Income is split into three categories indicating relative levels of income. Due to the discrete nature of the 
income brackets, it is not possible to split the sample into perfect quartiles. 
c: Age is defined by the age of the oldest person in the household. 
d: GfK divides the 270 Danish municipalities into categories depending on how urbanised they are and on their 
geographical location. The geographical location is ignored here, and the sample is split into rural, urban and Capital 
area municipalities. 
e: Highest level of education within the household. 
 
5 Theoretical Framework 
The utility of household i from purchasing an egg of type  { } 1,..., jJ ∈  at time 
{ } 1,..., i tT ∈  is assumed to depend on the type of egg j and the price of the egg pjt. As in 
Hanemann (1984), the utility function for household i is assumed to have the simple 
linear form 





i i it it t i jt ijt
tt
Uep Uep p β βε
==
== + + ∑∑   
Where ei is the vector of individual choices eit made by household i at time  { } 1,..., i tT ∈ , 
p is the  i TJ × vector of prices of all types of eggs at all choice occasions, 
j
i β  is an FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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alternative specific constant, measuring the household specific utility of egg type j, 
p β − is the utility of money (assumed constant across households, time and purchase 
choice) and  ijt ε is an unobserved error term. The panel dimension of the data is utilised 
by assuming that 
j
i β  is constant over time for the individual household, but varies 
between households and types of eggs. The marginal willingness to pay for a specific 











The price parameter – and thereby the utility of money – is assumed to be constant over 
egg types, whereas the choice specific parameters – and thereby the utility of the 
different egg types – are allowed to vary between egg types. The error terms  ijt ε  in (1) 
are assumed to be extreme value distributed, which means that the parameters can be 
estimated using a multinomial logit model.  
As usual in a discrete model, we can only estimate relative utility, which means that we 
estimate differences in utility (between types of eggs) and must choose an arbitrary 
normalisation to identify the scale. In order to estimate willingness to pay for eggs 
carrying labels indicating higher levels of animal welfare, the differences between the 
utility of battery eggs and the utilities of all other types of eggs are estimated.  
In the simplest version of the model the utility depends only on the type of egg 
purchased and the price paid: 
(3) 
()( ) () ( )













j p bat p
i i i i jt ijt i bat t i bat t
tt
T
jb a t p




ij t b a t t i j t
t
U e p U battery p p p
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−= + + − + +








i β %  is the difference in utility between type j and battery eggs. FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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The utility of barn and free-range eggs is assumed to vary systematically with the socio-
demographics presented in table 4. For a household with a high income (inc = H), aged 
45 to 59 (age = 45-59), living in the Capital area (urb = Cap) and having a long further 
education (edu = long) the utility of purchasing a barn egg at time t is modelled as: 
(4) 
() ( )
() 45 59 , , , ,
,, it t it t
barn barn barn barn barn p
i inc H age urb Cap edu long barn t bat t i barn t
U barn p U battery p
pp ββ β β β β ε == −= =
−=
++ + + + −+ %% % % % %
  
Note that the utility of the egg type 
j
i β %  in equation (3) is 
barn
i β % in this example, and now 
expresses the household specific utility of barn eggs compared to battery eggs, for the 
control group defined in table 3 and 4.  
As described in table 3 we have answers to questions about perception of animal 
welfare related to organic eggs and food safety related to organic chicken. This means 
that we can separate private utility (food safety) from potentially altruistic utility 
(animal welfare) when it comes to organic eggs. It is therefore possible to investigate 
whether altruistic motives actually play a significant role in the willingness to pay for 
organic eggs.  
It is assumed that the effect of trust in animal welfare or food safety is the same for all 
socio-demographic groups, and the utility of the public good (animal welfare) and the 
private good (food safety) is therefore added to the utility function without any 
interaction terms with socio-demographics. ‘No perceived difference’ is used as control 
group. If a household with the same characteristics as in (4) perceives the animal 




() 45 59 , , , ,
,, it i t
org org org
i animal safety
org org org org p
inc H age urb Cap edu long org t bat t i org t
U organic p U battery p
pp
ββ β





++ + + − +
%% %
%% % % %
  
Data show that some households buy organic eggs more frequently than others, which 
suggests variation in the household utility of organic eggs. To capture this variation and FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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to avoid Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
6 it is therefore assumed that the 
household utility is drawn from a distribution, and that the household utility is known to 
the household, but only the distribution is observable to the econometrician. The 
household likelihood function then becomes the likelihood function in the conventional 
multinomial logit model integrated over all possible values of β : 
(6)  () ( ) ( ) ,, ,, θ ββ θ β =∫
conv
ii i i L ep L epf d   
where  () f β θ  is the density of β  given the parameters θ . The parameters θ  of the 
distribution of the utility β  are therefore estimated, instead of β  itself. This is known 
as the Mixed MultiNomial Logit (MMNL) model (McFadden and Train, 2000). For 
applications of this model see for example Alfnes (2004), Carlsson et al. (2007), 
Bjørner et al. (2004), Liljenstolpe (2008), Lusk et al. (2003), McFadden and Train 
(2000), Revelt and Train (1998) or Train (1998, 1999). The MMNL model does not 
suffer from IIA, as long as at least one parameter is assumed to be drawn from a 
common distribution (mixed); see for example Train (1998).  
In this paper it is assumed that the utility of the three types of non-battery eggs 
compared to battery eggs () ,,
barn free org
iii βββ %%%  follows a multivariate normal distribution 
with correlation. The utility functions defined in (4) and (5) means that the variance of 
utility for a specific type of egg is assumed to be the same in all subsets of the 
population; only the mean is allowed to vary between groups of households. It is 
important to note that the estimated variances and covariances do not describe the utility 
of the different types of eggs, but rather the ‘utility premium’ compared to battery eggs. 
As in the conventional logit, the problem of the scale is solved by normalising the 
variance of the extreme value distributed error terms (theε ’s). Mixed logit models 
generally have a lower level of unexplained noise, because more variance is captured by 
the mixing. This means that the variance of the extreme value distributed error term 
which defines the normalisation is smaller and therefore that all parameters of a mixed 
logit are expected to have a higher absolute level than the parameters of a conventional 
                                                 
6 For more on IIA and mixed logit see Andersen, 2006. FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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logit. The ratios of parameters are not influenced by differences in scale, so the 
willingness to pay is not systematically affected by the mixing. 
6 Implementation of the Model 
Only the price of the chosen egg is observed, not the price of the alternatives, nor which 
alternatives are present in the purchase situation. As in Bjørner et al. 2004,
7 the prices 
are therefore imputed as the mean of all observed prices of eggs with a given label 
within a given week in the chain of stores in which the purchase was actually made.  
There are many unknown attributes of the purchased egg. The size of the egg is not 
recorded, and the store in which the purchase was made is only recorded at chain level. 
The freshness of the eggs is also unknown. These factors all contribute to unobserved 
heterogeneity in the prices. Using the observed price as an estimate of the price of the 
egg that was purchased, and comparing this price to mean prices for the types of eggs 
that were not purchased (by this household on this occasion) would mean that one was 
comparing the price of an egg of a given size, purchased in a given store and having a 
given freshness, with the price of an egg with a mixture of sizes, a mixture of stores and 
a mixture of different degrees of freshness. This would disturb the estimated effect of 
the prices, and thereby the estimated effect of the labels and other variables entering the 
model. It was therefore decided to impute all of the prices, including the price of the egg 
that was purchased. 
The definition of the choice set is also important. It may not be reasonable to expect 
eggs with all labels to be present in all purchase situations.
8 If eggs with a given label 
are not present, the type is said to be rationed. If rationing occurs, but is not revealed, it 
might mean that a person is perceived as choosing not to buy eggs with a specific label 
even though this label might have been preferred if it had been present. This will lead to 
                                                 
7 Bjørner et al. (2004) use GfK data to estimate willingness to pay for the Nordic Swan label, indicating 
environmentally friendly products. They use a mixed logit but in contrast to this paper they do not allow 
for correlation between mixed parameters. 
8 In some purchase situations the labels are not necessarily certified and/or no alternative can be 
expected to be available. This is e.g. the case for purchases directly from farms. These purchases are 
therefore excluded from the analysis, along with purchases where the price of battery eggs cannot be 
imputed. FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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a lower estimate of marginal willingness to pay for this label. This is an important fact 
to keep in mind when interpreting the results of the estimations, especially for barn and 
free-range eggs that have relatively low purchase shares.
9 In this application, eggs with 
a specific label are assumed to be rationed in a particular observation (and are therefore 
excluded from the choice set in this particular observation) if nobody purchased eggs 
with this label in the relevant group of stores during the week in question. 
The mixed multinomial logit models are estimated using a modified version of a 
programme developed by Kenneth Train, David Revelt, and Paul Ruud. This is an 
extension of the programme used in for example Bjørner et al. (2004), Revelt and Train 
(1998) and Train (1998). The extension allows estimation of correlations between 
normally distributed parameters. One of the virtues of this programme is that it takes 
account of the panel structure of the data. In this paper the simple Halton draws used in 
the extended programme by Train, Revelt and Ruud are replaced by antithetic Halton 
draws. This practically eliminates the noise in the log-likelihood values of different 
models, and thereby improves the reliability of the Likelihood Ratio tests. See Andersen 
(2008) for more on antithetic versus conventional Halton draws. 
The parameter for the utility of money is assumed to be the same for all households, 
whereas the parameters for eggs with different labels is assumed to follow a 
multivariate normal distribution.This implies that the estimated marginal willingness to 
pay is also assumed to be normally distributed. In MMNL language this means that the 
price parameter is fixed, and the reactions to egg labels are mixed. The utility of money 
is probably not the same for everyone, but in this case it is a question of semantics. It is 
not possible to tell whether the difference in willingness to pay origins from differences 
in utility of money or from utility of non-battery labels. The assumption that everyone 
has the same utility of money whereas the utility of labels is normally distributed is 
merely a convenient way of assuming that the willingness to pay is normally 
distributed. 
                                                 
9 Even if there was no rationing, the average purchase shares may influence the results. Types with a 
low purchase share are likely to have less shelf space, and are therefore less likely to be chosen at 




First, the model is estimated using only the price and the type of egg as explanatory 
variables. This version illustrates the results that could be obtained from data with no 
information on socio-demographics. To illustrate the difference between a conventional 
and a mixed logit, the results of a conventional model are compared with a mixed 
version of the same model. The conventional model is rejected, and information about 
socio-demographic factors and perception of animal welfare and food safety is then 
included in the mixed model and the results are discussed.  
The mixed multinomial logit estimates a distribution of the mixed parameters. The 
standard deviation of the normal distribution can be used as a measure of the degree of 
heterogeneity related to the utility of a given type of egg compared to battery eggs, and 
thereby also to the degree of heterogeneity of willingness to pay. Note that not only the 
variance but also the covariance is estimated. This provides interesting results about the 
relationship between the willingness to pay for eggs with different levels of animal 
welfare. The estimated correlations indicate the extent to which a high willingness to 
pay for e.g. organic eggs compared to battery eggs is correlated with a high willingness 
to pay for other types of eggs compared to battery eggs. 
The main hypotheses are: 
•  the willingness to pay compared to battery eggs is expected to be highest for 
organic eggs, lower for free-range eggs and lowest for barn eggs 
•  the correlation between willingness to pay for different types of eggs is expected 
to be highest between organic and free-range eggs 
•  The degree of heterogeneity is expected to be greater for organic eggs than for 
barn and free-range eggs 
•  households which perceive animal welfare as better for hens laying organic eggs 
are expected to have a higher willingness to pay, even when perception of food 
safety is controlled for 
The organic label is familiar from other goods and to some people it also includes a 
health aspect. This means that there are more potential sources of willingness to pay for FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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organic eggs than for free-range and barn eggs, which only differ from battery eggs in 
terms of animal welfare. The ranking of willingness to pay for organic, free-range and 
barn eggs compared to battery eggs is therefore expected to be highest for organic eggs. 
Free-range hens have access to outdoor areas and are therefore expected to have a better 
animal welfare than battery eggs. The willingness to pay is therefore expected to be 
lowest for barn eggs. The correlation between willingness to pay for different types of 
eggs is expected to be highest between organic and free-range eggs, because the 
production methods are very similar, and lowest between organic and barn eggs (but the 
correlation is still expected to be positive). The different sources of willingness to pay 
for organic eggs are expected to be positively correlated (people who believe that 
organic products are healthier are more familiar with the organic label). The degree of 
heterogeneity is therefore expected to be greater for organic eggs than for the other 
types. Perception of food safety is observed to be positively correlated with perception 
of animal welfare (see table 3), but is a private attribute (non-altruistic). It is therefore 
important to control for this private good when estimating the willingness to pay for the 
public good animal welfare. 
Table 5 compares the result of the conventional logit with the results of the simplest 
mixed logit. In both the estimated models the utility of price is negative and 
significantly different from zero, which means that the utility of money is positive, as 
expected. In the conventional logit the ranking of willingness to pay comes directly 
from the estimated parameters of the utility function. These are all negative, which 
means that the willingness to pay for non-battery eggs is lower than the willingness to 
pay for battery eggs. As an example, the willingness to pay for organic eggs compared 
to battery eggs is  () ( ) 0.21 0.45 0.47 −− = − . The conventional logit thus suggests that all 
households prefer to buy battery eggs unless the organic eggs are DKK 0.47 cheaper. At 
a first glance this is somewhat contra intuitive, as the price of non-battery eggs is 
usually higher than the price of battery eggs. But what it actually means is that the price 
difference is not enough to explain the low purchase shares of non-battery eggs. The 
logit model therefore estimates negative utility of the labels.  
 FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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Table 5 Results of Estimations Based on All Households, Including Only Type of Egg and Price  
(Model 1) 
   Conventional logit Mixed logit 
   Estimate SD Signific. Estimate SD Signific. 
Price   -0.45  0.032  ***  -0.39  0.122  *** 
Type of egg, utility relative to utility of battery eggs       
Means: Organic  -0.21  0.026  ***  -1.72  (0.200)  *** 
 Free-range  -1.17  0.024  ***  -1.40  (0.134)  *** 
 Barn  -0.77  0.013  ***  -0.80  (0.094)  *** 
Variance: Organic        20.73  (1.819)  *** 
 Free-range        7.56  (0.706)  *** 
 Barn        4.31  (0.395)  *** 
Correlation: (Organic,  free-range)        0.84     
 (Organic,  barn)        0.66     
 (Free-range,  barn)        0.79     
Log-likelihood -12,950  -8,385 
No. of households  844  844 
No. of observations  10,800  10,800 
Estimations using GfK purchase data on eggs from 26 June 1999 to 30 June 2000. Purchases made directly from farms 
excluded. Rationing is allowed. Number of antithetic Halton Draws is 7,500. ‘***’ is significant at the 1% level. 
The willingness to pay is higher for organic eggs than for barn eggs, as expected, but 
the willingness to pay for free-range eggs is lower than for barn eggs. This does not 
correspond with the expectation that willingness to pay for free-range eggs should lie 
between the willingness to pay for barn eggs and that for organic eggs. On the other 
hand, it fits well with the fact that free-range eggs have the lowest market share (see 
table 2). One explanation is that households may find it difficult to distinguish free-
range eggs from barn and organic eggs. If a household believes that there is no 
difference between barn and free-range eggs, barn eggs will be chosen because they are 
cheaper. If a household believes that there is almost no difference between free-range 
and organic eggs, organic eggs are more likely to be chosen, because organic eggs have 
a familiar label and may even be perceived as healthier, and are often not more 
expensive than free-range eggs. Baltzer (2004), who used scanner data from a large 
Danish retail chain, also found that the willingness to pay for free-range eggs was lower 
than for organic and barn eggs. 
A conventional logit can be seen as the special case of a mixed logit in which all 
standard deviations are zero. It is therefore possible to test the need for mixing by a 
likelihood ratio test with degrees of freedom equal to the number of mixed parameters. 
In the example in table 5 the likelihood ratio test becomes 
() 2 12,950 8,385 9,130 −⋅− + = . The degrees of freedom are equal to the number of 
parameters in the variance covariance matrix in the mixed model i.e. six in this case. FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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The conventional logit is therefore strongly rejected. The estimated negative willingness 
to pay underlines the fact that the conventional logit does a very poor job of explaining 
the willingness to pay, because it estimates one willingness to pay for all households. 
The rest of the paper therefore focuses on the mixed model.
10 
In this version of the mixed multinomial logit model both the mean and the variance-
covariance matrix of the willingness to pay are estimated, so the ranking of willingness 
to pay now depends on the share of the population who are willing to pay a given 
percentage extra, compared to the cost of a battery egg. The expectation is that the share 
of the population with a given willingness to pay for non-battery eggs is largest for 
organic eggs and smallest for barn eggs.  
The mean willingness to pay in the mixed logit in table 5 becomes negative for all three 
types of eggs, but now this simply means that the share of households with positive 
willingness to pay is less than 50 percent, and this does not seem unreasonable given the 
market shares presented in table 2 (between 10 percent and 26 percent). Based on the 
marginal distributions, the estimated share of households with positive willingness to 
pay is 35 percent for organic as well as barn eggs, and 31 percent for free-range eggs. 
The willingness to pay for organic eggs has the lowest mean, but the highest standard 
deviation. In this case the bigger standard deviation implies that the share of the 
population with willingness to pay higher than a given amount is bigger for organic 
eggs, once the amount becomes positive, even though the mean was lower than for the 
other types. The mixing changes not only the magnitude, but also the ranking of the 
means. However, as mentioned above, the ranking of the means is not necessarily the 
same as the ranking of willingness to pay. This difference between conventional and 
mixed logit is important to keep in mind whenever one tries to interpret results of a 
mixed logit. 
The standard deviation of the willingness to pay for organic eggs is 4.6 (20.73
½) and the 
standard deviations for free-range and barn eggs are 2.7 and 2.1. This supports the 
hypothesis that the organic label suggests other attributes in addition to animal welfare. 
                                                 
10 The mixed logit model relaxes the strict assumption of identical willingness to pay, but as in Alfnes 
(2004), Bjørner et al. (2004), Carlsson et al. (2005 and 2007) and Lusk et al. (2003), we do not capture 
the skewness which one might expect to find in willingness to pay for e.g. the organic attribute. FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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The correlation matrix estimated in this paper allows us to investigate the relationship 
between the willingness to pay for eggs with different levels of animal welfare. As 
expected, the estimated correlation between organic eggs and free-range eggs is larger 
than the other correlations, which Supports the findings in Harper and Makatouni 
(2002). The correlation between barn and free-range eggs is also higher than the 
correlation between barn and organic eggs, confirming that barn eggs and free-range 
eggs are closer substitutes than barn eggs and organic eggs.  
The simple mixed model in table 5 thus confirms the hypothesis that some share of the 
population has positive willingness to pay for non-battery eggs, that willingness to pay 
for barn eggs is lower than for organic eggs, that the variation in willingness to pay for 
organic eggs is higher than in the willingness to pay for barn and free-range eggs and 
that the correlation between willingness to pay is positive for all three types of non-
battery eggs, highest between organic and free-range eggs and lowest between organic 
and barn eggs. 
The mixed model from table 5 is repeated in table 6, together with a model where socio-
demographics and perceptions of animal welfare and food safety are included. The new 
variables are allowed to influence the mean utility of each type of egg separately, but 
not the standard deviations. This means that the model estimates differences in mean 
willingness to pay between households with different perceptions of eggs, and between 
different socio-demographic groups. The effect of perceptions of animal welfare and 
food safety is only allowed to influence the willingness to pay for organic eggs, whereas 
the socio-demographics are allowed to influence the willingness to pay differently for 
each of the three types of non-battery eggs.  
It is important to understand that the parameters for types cannot be compared directly 
between the two models (and not only because of the change in scale mentioned in the 
theory section). When socio-demographic factors and perception of organic eggs are 
included, it means that the estimated means no longer relate to the entire sample, but 
only to the control group. The utility of organic eggs is allowed to be influenced not 
only by socio-demographic factors, but also by perception of organic eggs. The result is 
that the mean utility for the control group becomes -4.00 which is radically different 
from the -1.72 for the entire sample in the simple model. FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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With perceptions and socio-demographics
Explanatory variable:  Estimate St. dev. Estimate St. dev.  LR  test
Price -0.39 (0.122) *** -0.38 (0.122)  ***
Types of eggs, measured relative to battery eggs 
Means: Organic  -1.72 (0.200)*** -4.00 (0.512)  ***
 Free-range  -1.40 (0.134)*** -2.43 (0.333)  ***
 Barn  -0.80 (0.094)*** -0.84 (0.241)  ***
Variance: Organic  20.73 (1.819)*** 17.16 (1.552)  ***
 Free-range  7.56 (0.706)*** 6.77 (0.687)  ***
 Barn  4.31 (0.395)*** 4.17 (0.383)  ***
Correlation: (Organic,  free-range)  0.84  0.81  
 (Organic,  barn)  0.66   0.67  
 (Free-range,  barn)  0.79   0.71  
Perception of animal welfare in organic eggs, no difference is control group 
Organic  Negative organic animal welfare      -0.17 (0.727) 
()
2
2 15.24 0.000 χ =   Positive organic animal welfare      0.99 (0.285)  ***
Perception of food safety in organic chicken, no difference is control group 
Organic  Negative organic food safety      -0.55 (0.697) 
()
2
2 12.21 0.002 χ =   Positive organic food safety      0.91 (0.274)  ***
Income, lowest 25% is control group 
Organic Mid  50%      0.24 (0.329) 
()
2
2 5.56 0.062 χ =  Highest  25%      0.71 (0.393)  *
Free-range Mid  50%      0.08 (0.230) 
()
2
2 4.95 0.084 χ =  Highest  25%      0.49 (0.278)  *
Barn Mid  50%     0.10 (0.189) 
()
2
2 0.68 0.712 χ =  Highest  25%      0.18 (0.239) 
Age, 60+ is control group 
Organic  Age 18 to 44      -0.88 (0.392)  ** ()
2
2 5.27 0.072 χ =   Age 45 to 59      -0.53 (0.305)  *
Free-range  Age 18 to 44      -0.49 (0.276)  * ()
2
2 4.53 0.104 χ =   Age 45 to 59      -0.47 (0.248)  *
Barn  Age 18 to 44      -0.70 (0.213)  *** ()
2
2 10.18 0.006 χ =   Age 45 to 59      -0.43 (0.205)  **
Urbanisation, rural municipalities is control group 
Organic Capital  area      2.64 (0.438)  *** ()
2
2 39.84 0.000 χ =  Urban  municipality      0.72 (0.368)  *
Free-range Capital  area      1.21 (0.292)  *** ()
2
2 17.42 0.000 χ =  Urban  municipality      0.64 (0.270)  **
Barn Capital  area     0.09 (0.240) 
()
2
2 0.35 0.839 χ =  Urban  municipality      -0.04 (0.209) 
Highest level of education, no further education stated is control group 
Organic Voc.-oriented  high-school      0.51 (0.462) 
()
2
4 7.14 0.128 χ =
  Short further education      0.77 (0.530) 
  Medium further education      1.12 (0.493)  **
  Long further education      1.69 (0.852)  **
Free-range Voc.-oriented  high-school      0.58 (0.287)  **
()
2
4 7.92 0.095 χ =
  Short further education      0.82 (0.357)  **
  Medium further education      0.80 (0.337)  **
  Long further education      1.09 (0.692) 
Barn Voc.-oriented  high-school     0.37 (0.229) 
()
2
4 5.48 0.241 χ =
  Short further education      0.26 (0.276) 
  Medium further education      0.59 (0.271)  **
  Long further education      -0.03 (0.499) 
Log-likelihood -8,384.65     -8,305.71    
No. of households  844      844    
No. of observations  10,800      10,800    
Estimations using GfK purchase data on eggs from 26 June 1999 to 30 June 2000 combined with answers to AKF/GfK 
questionnaire from 2002. Purchases made directly from farms excluded. Rationing is allowed. Number of antithetic 
Halton Draws is 7,500. ‘***’ is significant at the 1% level, ‘**’ at the 5% level and ‘*’ at the 10% level. The LR tests show 
the results of comparing model 2 with a model excluding variables group by group. FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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The estimations show that the only socio–demographic factor which influences the 
utility of barn eggs significantly is age, and the utility of barn eggs for the control group 
is therefore very close to the utility of barn eggs in the simple model. Introducing socio-
demographic factors reduces the estimated variation a little because some of the 
variation is now captured in the socio-demographics, but the effect is not dramatic. The 
correlations remain practically the same as in the simple model. Just as in table 5, the 
standard deviations are large, indicating that the model explains little of the 
heterogeneity of preferences in the population. The heterogeneity seems to be driven by 
either other socio-demographic factors, or more likely, by differences in general view of 
the world; and attitudes towards food related topics in particular. 
Simulating the multivariate normal distribution (Alfnes, 2004), and adjusting the 
simulation for number of purchases made by each household, shows that non-battery 
eggs are chosen by only 39 percent of the control group, even if the price premium for 
all types of non-battery eggs is zero (see table 8).
11 Using the observed characteristics of 
the sample rather than the control group, we still find that only 51 percent of the 




                                                 
11 The panel version of the mixed logit model used in this paper assumes that the individual willingness 
to pay is constant over time, but varies between individuals. In order to maintain this panel dimension of 
the model, the purchase shares have been simulated by drawing 100 possible values of willingness to 
pay for each of the 844 households in the sample. The draws are from the tree dimensional normal 
distribution estimated in Table 6, using also the estimated correlation between the utility of barn, free-
range and organic eggs. The estimated utility parameters have been normalised by the price parameter 
in order to simulate the willingness to pay. The original sample consisted of 10,800 actual choices made 
by the 844 households. Each of these choices has been repeated 100 times using the simulated values of 
willingness to pay. The predicted choice is in each of the 1,080,000 simulated cases the type of eggs 
which gives the highest consumer surplus, i.e. the type with the biggest positive difference between 
willingness to pay and price (which for simplicity is always equal to the price of battery eggs). If the 
difference is negative for all three types of non-battery eggs, battery eggs are chosen. FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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Table 8 shows the simulated purchase shares
12 (Alfnes, 2004) for different scenarios 
defined in table 3. Scenario A is the control group, scenario B is the actual sample and 
scenario C to N are scenarios where one characteristic of all households is fixed, while 
all other characteristics are allowed to vary. These latter scenarios tell us how the 
purchase shares would change if everyone in the sample e.g. had a high income 
(scenario C) or a low income (scenario D). Scenario O and P describes scenarios related 
to combinations of animal welfare and food safety. Table 9 highlights the differences 
between certain scenarios, e.g. the difference between the scenario where everyone has 
a high income and the one where everyone has a low income (scenario C-D). 





safety Income  Age 
Urbani-
sation Education 
A  Control household  No dif.  No dif.  Lowest  60+  Rural  No further 
B Sample  households  *  * * * *  *
C  Sample + high income  *  * Highest * *  *
D  Sample + low income  *  * Lowest * *  *
E  Sample + age 60+  *  * * 60+ *  *
F  Sample + age 18-44  *  * * 18-44 *  *
G  Sample + capital  *  * * * Capital  *
H  Sample + rural  *  * * * Rural  *
I  Sample + long educ  *  * * * *  Long
J  Sample + no educ  *  * * * *  No further
K  Sample + animal  Better  * * * *  *
L  Sample + no dif. animal  No dif.  * * * *  *
M  Sample + safety  *  Better * * *  *
N  Sample + no dif. safety  *  No dif. * * *  *
O  Sample + animal, safety  Better  Better * * *  *
P  Sample + no dif. Animal, 
safety 
No dif.  No dif. * * *  *
* Varies between households. 
 
 
                                                 
12 The panel version of the mixed logit model used in this paper assumes that the individual willingness 
to pay is constant over time, but varies between individuals. In order to maintain this panel dimension of 
the model, the purchase shares have been simulated by drawing 100 possible values of willingness to 
pay for each of the 844 households in the sample. The draws are from the tree dimensional normal 
distribution estimated in Table 2, using also the estimated correlation between the utility of barn, free-
range and organic eggs. The estimated utility parameters have been normalised by the price parameter 
in order to simulate the willingness to pay. The original sample consisted of 10,800 actual choices made 
by the 844 households. Each of these choices has been repeated 100 times using the simulated values of 
willingness to pay. The predicted choice is in each of the 1,080,000 simulated cases the type of eggs 
which gives the highest consumer surplus, i.e. the type with the biggest positive difference between 
willingness to pay and price (which for simplicity is always equal to the price of battery eggs). If the 
difference is negative for all three types of non-battery eggs, battery eggs are chosen. FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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The results in table 8 are influenced both by the estimated parameters presented in table 
6, and the composition of the sample presented in table 3 and 4. In table 6, the highest 
absolute difference in utility is 2.46 which is for purchases of organic eggs in the capital 
area compared to rural municipalities (control group). From table 4 we know that only 
25 percent of the households live in the capital area, while 46 percent live in an urban 
municipality and 29 percent live in a rural municipality. Letting everyone live in the 
capital area in scenario G therefore changes the utility of organic eggs a lot, and for a 
large share of the sample. The result is that only 40 percent of all purchases are 
predicted to be battery eggs in this scenario, while 43 percent are predicted to be 
organic.  
Table 8 Simulated purchase shares, percent 
Scenario Battery Barn Free-range Organic  Total 
A  Control  household  61  24 4 11  100 
B  Sample  households 49  14 8 28  100 
C  Sample + high income  46  13  9  31  100 
D  Sample + low income  52  14  7  26  100 
E  Sample + age 60+  44  17  8  30  100 
F  Sample + age 18-44  55  11  8  25  100 
G  Sample + capital  40  9  8  43  100 
H  Sample + rural  55  20  5  20  100 
I  Sample + long educ  45  7  10  38  100 
J  Sample + no educ  56  14  6  25  100 
K  Sample + animal  49  14  8  28  100 
L  Sample + no dif. animal  53  17  11  20  100 
M  Sample + safety  49  14  8  29  100 
N  Sample + no dif .safety  52  17  10  21  100 
O  Sample + animal, safety  49  14  8  29  100 
P  Sample + no dif. Animal, 
no dif. safety 
55 19 13 13  100 
Source: Own calculations based on estimations using GfK purchase data on eggs from 26 June 1999 to 30 June 2000 
combined with answers to AKF/GfK questionnaire from 2002. Estimations are presented in table 6, households in table 
4 and scenarios in table 7. 
 
From table 9, scenario G-H, it is evident that the difference in probability of choosing 
organic eggs in rural municipalities and the capital area comes not only from a decrease 
in the probability of purchasing battery eggs, but also from a decrease in the probability 
of purchasing barn eggs. The probability of purchasing free-range eggs increase when 
the scenario is moved from rural municipalities to the capital area, so in this case both 
free-range and organic eggs cannibalise barn eggs as well as battery eggs. This means 
that the increase in probability of purchasing organic eggs cannot be translated directly 
to a decrease in the probability of purchasing non-battery eggs. 
 FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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Table 9 Differences between scenarios, percentage points 
Scenario Battery Barn Free-range Organic  Total 
C-D  High - low income  -6  -1  2  5  0 
E-F  age 60+ - ‘18-44’  -11  6  0  5  0 
G-H  Capital - rural  -15  -10  3  23  0 
I-J  Long - no educ.  -11  -7  5  13  0 
K-L  Better - no dif animal  -3  -2  -3  9  0 
M-N  Better - no dif safety  -3  -2  -3  8  0 
O-P  Better - no dif. Animal, 
safety 
-5 -4 -6 15  0 
Source: Own calculations based on table 8. 
 
From table 9 it is clear that differences in degree of urbanisation are the most important 
demographic effect in the model, whereas differences in income have the lowest effect. 
In table 6 we see that the utility of organic eggs increases significantly when the 
household trusts that organic production has positive effects on either animal welfare or 
food safety. This means that purchases of organic eggs are not solely driven by private 
motives (such as food safety), but also by potentially altruistic motives (animal 
welfare). However, the effect of trust in better animal welfare for hens laying organic 
eggs compared to no difference in animal welfare between organic and conventional 
production is only a nine percentage point increase from 20 to 28 percent in positive 
willingness to pay for organic eggs, (see table 9 and table 8). The rest of the organic 
purchases are explained by other factors than animal welfare. The results therefore 
indicate that stated willingness to pay is to a very large extent cheap talk. It is also 
worth noting that even in the scenario where no one believes in better animal welfare or 
better food safety, the organic purchase share is still predicted to be 13 percent (scenario 
P). This means that organic purchases are also motivated by other factors.  
Turning to the significance of the estimated differences, the LR tests in table 6 show the 
results of comparing the model with perception and socio-demographics (model 2) with 
a model excluding variables group by group. The difference between the log-likelihood 
of model 2 and a model without perception of organic animal welfare is 7.62 = 15.24/2, 
which means that the LR test rejects that animal welfare can be excluded, and therefore 
has a significant effect. At the other end of the scale, the test for the effect of income on 
barn eggs (probability 71.2 percent) shows that income has no significant effect on barn 
eggs. FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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The effect of socio-demographics is very similar for organic and free-range eggs. 
Income is barely significant, and neither is age. However, urbanisation and to some 
degree education has a positive effect on the utility of these types of eggs. The picture is 
somewhat different for barn eggs, where only age seems to make a difference. 
8 Conclusion 
The results in this paper show that expressed concern for animal welfare as in e.g. the 
Eurobarometer from 2005 is to a large extent just cheap talk. Although a significant 
share of the population is willing to pay in order to increase animal welfare, even 
controlling for food safety, the effect of animal welfare on predicted purchase shares is 
relatively small. Labelling eggs for increased animal welfare may raise the level of 
animal welfare a little, but purchases appear to be driven largely by other attributes than 
animal welfare. The results suggest that hypothetical bias is considerable when 
estimating the willingness to pay for animal welfare.  
The estimated correlation between willingness to pay for barn, free-range and organic 
egg compared to battery eggs are positive for all three types of non-battery eggs, highest 
between organic and free-range eggs and lowest between organic and barn eggs. This 
indicates that organic and free-range eggs are considered very similar, while barn eggs 
are considered as quite different from organic eggs. 
As expected, the willingness to pay for organic eggs displayed more heterogeneity than 
either barn or free-range eggs (multiple sources of value, e.g. familiar label and health), 
and the willingness to pay for organic eggs was generally higher than for barn eggs. 
Contrary to expectation, the willingness to pay was lowest for free-range eggs. 
However, this result has been seen in at least one other study using completely different 
methods (Baltzer, 2004). A plausible explanation could be that people either confuse 
barn eggs with free-range and prefer the cheaper barn eggs, or realise that free-range 
eggs are close to organic both in attributes and price and therefore prefer organic eggs, 
which yield both a familiar label and perhaps also an expected positive health effect. 
Finally, willingness to pay for free-range and organic eggs is higher in urbanised 
municipalities and for households with relatively high incomes. Higher levels of FOI Working Paper 2010/6  
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education also influence the willingness to pay positively. The willingness to pay for 
barn eggs is mainly influenced by age; the older the household, the greater the 
willingness to pay. 
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